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FIFTH AMENDMENT-IMPEACHMENT
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975)
In two recent cases the Supreme Court considered
whether evidence which is inadmissible as proof of
guilt may be used by the prosecution on cross-exami-
nation to impeach the credibility of a defendant who
testifies in his own behalf. The first case, Oregon v.
Hass, I raised the issue of admitting for purposes of
impeachment illegally obtained statements made by
an accused during police interrogation. The accused
was properly informed of his rights as required by
Miranda v. Arizona,' and he then attempted to
exercise them by asking to contact his lawyer. The
Court held that his subsequent statements were
properly admitted at trial for the limited purpose of
impeaching his credibility. Relying on Harris v. New
York, 3 and rejecting the argument that the police
would be encouraged to press their investigation
before the accused had benefit of counsel, the Court
in Hass reduced the effectiveness of the safeguards
against self-incrimination provided by Miranda.'
In the second case, United States v. Hale,' the
Court confronted the issue of whether an accused's
silence in the face of police questioning can be used to
impeach his exculpatory testimony at trial. It found
that the accused's failure to respond to questioning
could be understood in several ways, and did not
necessarily imply that his later explanations were
false. Therefore, comment on the defendant's pre-
'420 U.S. 714 (1975).
2384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that four
warnings be given to a suspect before questioning begins:
his right to remain silent; the fact that what he says can be
used in court against him; his right to counsel; and his right
to free counsel if indigent. Id. at 479. Statements made by
the defendant when he has not been fully informed of his
rights are not admissible as evidence against him.
3401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris the accused was not
informed of his right to consult an attorney. The Court
permitted the prosecution to use his statements in cross-
examination, drawing a distinction between evidence used
for the prosecution's case in chief and statements used to
impeach the credibility of the defendant who testifies at
trial. Id. at 225-26. For a discussion of Harris see Note,
Fifth Amendment-Impeachment, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
473 (1971).
'Miranda states that if an individual asks to consult an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present. 384 U.S. at 474.
5422 U.S. 171 (1975).
trial silence was highly -prejudicial and should have
been excluded. The Court rested its opinion on
evidentiary grounds, declining to reach the question
of constitutional privilege.
These two cases, treating the issue of whether a
defendant's reactions to police interrogation may be
used to impeach him, consider the value of the
evidence as proof of inconsistency, rather than the
extent to which a defendant's constitutional rights
may be infringed. In Hass, the value of prior
inconsistent statements is assumed, and the Court
deals only with the problem of admitting illegal
evidence; in Hale, the Court holds that silence has
very little value for proving inconsistency. Neither
case devotes much attention to the issue of self-
incrimination. The Court in Hass has continued to
limit Miranda, and in Hale it has looked to a
pre-Miranda decision as the controlling authority.
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS
The defendant in Oregon v. Hass was arrested,
informed of his rights, and questioned about the theft
of a bicycle from a residential garage. He replied that
two bicycles had been stolen and he did not know
which one the officer was talking about. He had
returned one, and the other was where he had left it.
In the patrol car, Hass said that he was in a lot of
trouble and would like to telephone a lawyer. The
officer told him he could do so when they got back.
Then Hass responded to further questions, pointing
out the spot where one bicycle was hidden, and
indicating the two houses from which the bicycles
had been taken.
The trial court ruled that statements made by
Hass after he said he wanted to see a lawyer were not
admissible in evidence. Hass then testified that he
had been riding with two friends, that he did not
know the bicycles were going to be stolen, but that he
had helped to conceal one of them. He also denied
knowing which houses had been burglarized. The
police officer testified in rebuttal that Hass had made
statements about the location of the houses and had
pointed them out. The jury was instructed that these
statements could not be considered as proof of guilt,
19
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but only as bearing on the defendant's credibility as a
witness. Hass was convicted of burglary.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed 6 because
the trial court allowed information obtained by police
in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach the
defendant's testimony. It noted that Harris v. New
York' held such evidence to be admissible for
impeachment purposes, but considered itself bound
by Oregon precedent.' The Supreme Court of Ore-
gon affirmed.' It reasoned that Harris was not
controlling because that was a case where the
defendant had given information to the police before
he had been told of his right to consult an attorney. "o
In the present case, however, proper warnings had
been given, and the accused had chosen to exercise
his rights. If the State were permitted to use his
subsequent statements for impeachment, the police
would have an incentive for pressing the investiga-
tion before the accused could be given legal advice. ' 1
The United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon. It held
that statements made by Hass in police custody after
he had been told of his rights and had asked to
telephone a lawyer, but before he had been given the
opportunity to do so, -were iadmissible at trial for
impeachment purposes. The Court reviewed the case
because "it bore upon the reach of our decision in
Harris v. New York." 2
In that case, the defendant Harris was convicted of
selling narcotics to an undercover agent. At trial he
testified that he had sold the agent two envelopes of
baking powder in a scheme to defraud the purchaser.
The prosecution then questioned him about in-
criminating admissions he had made during police
interrogation, before he had been informed of his
right to consult an attorney. The trial judge in-
structed the jury to consider these statements only as
reflecting on the defendant's credibility. The Su-
preme Court ruled that the defendant's credibility
was appropriately impeached by the use of his earlier
conflicting statements. While Miranda barred such
evidence from being used to establish the prosecu-
613 Ore. App. 368, 510 P.2d 852 (1973).
7401 U.S. 222 (1971).
'The Oregon case, decided before Harris, was State v.
Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387
U.S. 943 (1967).
'267 Ore. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973).
"By the same reasoning, the court found it unnecessary
to consider whether to overrule State v. Brewton, 247 Ore.
241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967),
where information secured in violation of the rules set forth
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) was not
permitted to be used for impeachment purposes.
1267 Ore. at 493, 517 P.2d at 673.
'2420 U.S. at 718.
tion's case, it did not follow that the evidence was
inadmissible for all purposes. '3
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in
Hass, 14 applied the principles of Harris, and stated
that impeaching material can provide "valuable
aid" to the jury in assessing the defendant's credi-
bility. The majority felt that the value of this process
should not be sacrificed because of some "speculative
possibility" that police misconduct would be en-
couraged by permitting the prosecution to make use
of such evidence to impeach a defendant's testimony.
If it is assumed that deterrence of police misconduct
is necessary, said Justice Blackmun, there is suffi-
cient deterrence when illegally obtained evidence
is made inadmissible for the case in chief. If in a
particular case an officer's conduct becomes abusive,
"that case... may be taken care of when it arises
measured by the traditional standards for evaluating
voluntariness and trustworthiness."" But to ex-
clude impeaching statements altogether would be to
give the defendant a license for perjury. 16
The effect of inadmissibility in the Harris case and in
this case is the same: inadmissibility would pervert the
constitutional right into a right to falsify free from the
embarrassment of impeachment evidence from the
defendant's own mouth."
"3 The Court in Harris said that Miranda comments
barring use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose
were not necessary to the holding of that case. 401 U.S. at
224.
"4 Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, White, Powell and Rehnquist. Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions.
Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration of the
case.
Is420 U.S. at 723. The Harris requirement that the
trustworthiness of the evidence satisfy "legal standards"
was apparently met in this case, as in Hams, by the fact
that the defendant's statements to the police had not been
coerced. Miranda stated a broader view of coercion:
[Alny statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compul-
sion, subtle or otherwise.
384 U.S. at 474. Harris abandoned the assumption that a
statement cannot be truly voluntary unless a suspect is fully
aware of his rights and makes a knowing and intelligent
waiver. See Note, Harris v. New York: The Retreat from
Miranda, 32 LA. L. REv. 650 (1972).
"6 The assumption here is that statements made to the
police will all be true. As a matter of fact, in the Harris case
the District Attorney acknowledged that the account de-
fendant gave police was false. See Dershowitz & Ely, Har-
ris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Can-
dor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE
L.J. 1198, 1222 & n.96 (1971). Petitioner's lawyer
pointed out that an inexperienced person, without benefit
of counsel, may be afraid to tell the police what happened
and may make up a false exculpatory statement. Id.
11420 U.S. at 723.
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The Court dismissed the deterrence argument
made by the Supreme Court of Oregon for distin-
guishing Harris. The state court said that police
were generally unwilling to risk losing directly
admissible evidence by failing to give warnings, and
that therefore the Harris decision perhaps did not
encourage police violations. But the police would, it
felt, have an incentive for pressing the investigation,
in violation of Miranda, after the suspect asked for a
lawyer. The chance of obtaining statements with
which to discredit the defendant at trial was signifi-
cantly more than the police were likely to have after
the suspect was advised by counsel. 'Justice Black-
mun described this as a "speculative possibility,"
apparently implying that the deterrence argument
has been exaggerated. In addition, he could find no
significant difference between an inadvertent failure
to adhere to Miranda rules and a deliberate disre-
gard for full compliance. In both instances the
penalty was the same, that is, loss of directly
admissible evidence, and thus the deterrent effect was
presumably equal and adequate.
One might concede that when proper Miranda
warnings have been given, and the officer then contin-
ues his interrogation after the suspect asks for an
attorney, the officer may be said to have little to lose
and perhaps something to gain by way of possibly
uncovering impeachment material. This speculative
possibility, however, is even greater where the warn-
ings are defective and the defect is not known to the
officer. In any event, the balance was struck in Harris,
and we are not disposed to change it now. 19
By force of its judicial authority rather than by
persuasive argument, the Court thus declared that
the incentive for police to violate the law was
insignificant.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
wrote a brief dissent in which he adhered to his
dissent in Harris. He strongly criticized any sanc-
tioning of unlawful government conduct.
[Ilt is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the
law-breaking police officer. It is abiding truth that
"[niothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws .... 20
Justice Brennan felt that a statement is just as
incriminating when used to impeach a defendant's
credibility as when introduced in direct evidence. He
also found that the Court's holding gave incentive to
the police to press their interrogation of an individual
18267 Ore. at 492-93, 517 P.2d at 673.
19420 U.S. at 723.
2
0Id. at 724.
who requests an attorney, "since the attorney will
advise the accused to remain silent."' 2 He was
unwilling to join in what he regarded as a "funda-
mental erosion" of fifth and sixth amendment rights.
Justice Marshall's separate dissenting opinion,
joined by Justice Brennan, discussed the question of
jurisdiction. He felt that the Court should not have
exercised jurisdiction in this case, since there was a
possibility that the state court judgment had been
based on independent state grounds. 22
Where we have been unable to say with certainty
that thejudgment rested solely on federal law grounds,
we have refused to rule on the federal issue in the case;
the proper course is then either to dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted or to remand the case to the
state court to clarify the basis of its decision.
23
Justice Marshall also felt that it was sound policy to
permit the state court to decide whether its police
would be subject to stricter rules than were required
as a federal constitutional minimum. The decision of
the Oregon court purported to deter police miscon-
duct by completely excluding illegally obtained state-
ments. This was, he felt, an independent conclusion
in an area appropriate for state determination. Jus-
tice Marshall added that even if the decision had
been based solely on federal law, the case should be
remanded; the state still had the option of consider-
ing the defendant's state law claims, or of ruling the
statement in question inadmissible as a matter of
state law. He criticized the Court's increasingly com-
mon practice of correcting state courts in their view
of federal constitutional questions "without suffi-
ciently considering the risk that we will be drawn
into rendering a purely advisory opinion." 24
211d. at 725.
22Id. at 728. The rule in such cases is stated in Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935):
Where the judgment of a state court rests upon two
grounds, one of which is federal and the other
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the
non-federal ground is independent of the federal
ground and adequate to support the judgment.
Justice Marshall pointed out that while the Oregon court
did not expressly cite state law in support of its judgment,
the constitution of Oregon contains an independent prohibi-
tion against compulsory self-incrimination, and the court's
opinion suggests it may have considered the matter one of
state as well as federal law. 420 U.S. at 727-28.
21420 U.S. at 727. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33
(1972); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380
U.S. 194 (1965).
24420 U.S. at 726. Justice Marshall refers in particular
to Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973) (reversing the
Michigan Supreme Court holding which had rejected
imposing a higher sentence on defendant on retrial);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (affirming a
19751
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The majority opinion affirmed the Court's juris-
diction by stating that the case was decided by the
Oregon courts on fifth and fourteenth amendment
grounds, that neither state law nor the Oregon
constitution was cited for the decision, and that the
state court found it necessary to attempt to distin-
guish Harris. The Court briefly considered argu-
ments raised by Hass that a State is free to impose
greater restrictions on the prosecution than required
by federal law. 25 It explained that while state law
may be restrictive of police activity:
a State may not impose such greater restrictions as a
matter of federal constitutional law when this Court
specifically refrains from imposing them. 26
Since the Court had determined that this case was
decided by the Oregon court on the basis of federal
law, Hass' arguments failed.27
Wisconsin Supreme Court holding which reversed convic-
tions of the Amish for violating the state's compulsory
school-attendance law); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424
(1971) (vacating a judgment of the California Supreme
Court that the "hit and run" statute as written violated
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (reversing a holding that
witness' prior statement not subject to cross-examination
when originally made could not be introduced under the
California Evidence Code to prove charges against the
defendant without violating his sixth amendment right of
confrontation).
2 CJ. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967),
where a police search was held not to have violated the
fourth amendment. The Court added that the holding did
not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on
searches and seizures than required by the Federal Consti-
tution. See also State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 368-69,
520 P.2d 51, 58 (1974).
26420 U.S. at 719. The Court cited Smayda v. United
States, 352 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 981 (1966) (the question in a federal court, whether
surveillance was an unreasonable search under the As-
similative Crimes Act, is a federal question; surveillance
forbidden by the California Constitution was held not to be
unreasonable under the fourth amendment) and Aftanase v.
Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 193 (8th Cir. 1965) (in
the question of jurisdiction in a diversity case, whether due
process requirements have been met is a federal question).
"7Many state court decisions have followed the Harris
exception to Miranda, often as a departure from their own
precedents which had excluded tainted pre-trial statements
for all purposes. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551,
187 S.E.2d 111 (1972); Jorgensen v. People, 174 Colo. 144,
482 P.2d 962 (1971). In Commonwealth v. Harris,
-.Mass.__, 303 N.E.2d 115 (1973), where a youth
claimed he gave a false alibi to the police because he was
scared and he felt no one would believe the truth, evidence
of inconsistent statements was admissible for impeachment
in spite of defective warnings. Massachusetts specifically
refused to find greater protection for the defendant in its
own constitution than that provided by federal law:
Hass constitutes a predictable sequel to Harris.
Once the Court ruled that a defendant's testimony
may be impeached by the use of illegally obtained
prior statements bearing directly on the crime
charged, the basis for drawing a distinction between
two forms of "technical" violations of the defendant's
constitutional rights disappeared. The argument for
making such a distinction assumes the necessity for
We are free to take this course... [but] we de-
cline the invitation to adopt the reasoning of the dis-
senting justices in the Supreme Court of the United
States.
303 N.E.2d at 117. California, in a four to three decision,
narrowly limited Harris by finding that prior illegally
obtained statements were not "inconsistent" with unelabo-
rated denials at trial. People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 501
P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972). The majority felt that
the goals of the exclusionary rule, deterrence of the police
and integrity of the courts, "would be ill served indeed if the
People were permitted to do indirectly that which they are
forbidden to do directly .... " 8 Cal. 3d at 179, 501 P.2d
at 921, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 353. But in People v. Nudd, 12
Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974), the
balance on the court changed and the Harris rationale was
adopted; a defendant was held to be properly impeached by
a statement made after he had invoked his right to silence.
The dissent argued that California had an independent
exclusionary rule, adopted six years prior to the application
to the states of the federal rule.
On the other hand, Texas and Hawaii have decided the
impeachment issue squarely on state law. In Butler v. State,
493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), the court found
that the Harris reasoning, based on policy factors such as
regulation of police conduct, was not persuasive where the
exclusionary rule is supported by other reasons. Fundamen-
tal to Texas statutes regulating the admissibility of oral
confessions is the determination that "proof of extra-judi-
cial oral confessions made while in custody are generally
unreliable." 493 S.W.2d at 193. Since the United States
Supreme Court requires that evidence, to be admissible for
impeachment purposes, must satisfy "legal standards of
trustworthiness," Harris cannot be read to authorize such
unreliable statements. This reasoning is interesting in light
of the holding in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171
(1975), that pre-trial silence is too ambiguous to be used
for impeachment.
The Hawaii Supreme Court relied on the state constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination to exclude ille-
gally obtained statements in State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii
254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971). "To convict a person on the basis
of statements procured in violation of his constitutional
rights is intolerable." 53 Hawaii at 267, 492 P.2d at 665.
See also State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51
(1974), a case involving search and seizure, where the court
said:
[T] his court has final, unreviewable authority to inter-
pret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution. We have
not hesitated in the past to extend the protections of
the Hawaii Bill of Rights beyond those of textually
parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights when
logic and a sound regard for the purposes of those
protections have so warranted.
55 Hawaii at 369, 520 P.2d at 58.
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(1) controlling police practices by creating sanctions
against illegal conduct, and (2) supporting an ac-
cused in the effective exercise of his rights. As to the
first assumption, the Court has decided that no
further deterrence of police activity is justified, both
because the necessity for it is "speculative" and
because there is a possibility that a defendant might
find it easier to perjure himself. As to the second
assumption, the majority feels that constitutional
rights are sufficiently protected when the penalty for
violations is the loss of direct evidence. An accused in
custody must be informed of his rights, but the police
are no longer obliged fully to cooperate should he
choose to exercise his right to consult an attorney.
The Miranda Court viewed the coercive pressures of
an arrest as an argument for providing extra protec-
tion to the accused: when he requested counsel, the
police were required to stop questioning him.
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surround-
ings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice.
28
The present Court has suggested, on the contrary,
that since the inherent pressures of being held in
custody are a normal incidence of any arrest, the
accused is not in special need of protection. It said of
Hass:
He properly sensed, to be sure, that he was in
'trouble'; but the pressure on him was no greater than
that on any person in like custody or under inquiry by
any investigating officer.
29
Any statement the accused makes in these circum-
stances will be considered voluntary in the absence of
traditional standards for evaluating coercion. If the
statements are voluntary, they will be admissible
should the prosecution wish to impeach the credibil-
ity of a defendant who takes the stand to testify.
IMPEACHMENT BY SILENCE
In United States v. Hale, the Supreme Court
considered whether a defendant's prior silence may
be used at trial to impeach his credibility. Attempting
to discredit his testimony, the prosecution questioned
the defendant about his failure to respond to police
questions. In a unanimous decision, the Court held
that "the probative value of respondent's pre-trial
silence in this case was outweighed by the prejudicial
impact of admitting it into evidence." 3 Silence in
28384 U.S. at 458.
29420 U.S. at 722-23.
30422 U.S. at 173.
these circumstances did not constitute a prior incon-
sistent "statement."
The defendant, William Hale, stood on the street
talking with another man when the victim of a
robbery pointed him out to the police as one of five
men who had just attacked him and stolen $96. As
the police ran up to Hale, he and the other man fled.
The police immediately apprehended Hale, placed
him under arrest and took him to the police station
where he was advised of his rights and searched.
When an officer asked him to explain how he had
obtained the $158 found in his possession, Hale
made no response.
At his trial, Hale testified that he had spoken with
the victim shortly before the robbery, that he had
then gone to a narcotics treatment center where he
had been during the time of the robbery, and that he
had left the center with a friend who subsequently
purchased narcotics. Hale explained that he had run
from the police because he was afraid to be found
with a person carrying narcotics. He testified that his
estranged wife had given him $150 of her welfare
check so that he could purchase some money orders
for her, as he had done in the past. In an effort to
impeach Hale's testimony, the prosecutor asked him
why he had not given this explanation to the police.
Hale replied that he had not felt it was necessary at
the time."
Hale was convicted of robbery in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed" 2 on the grounds that questioning the
defendant about his previous silence was prejudicial,
and that such questioning infringed on his constitu-
tional rights. The constitutional ruling was based on
Miranda v. Arizona,"3 where the Supreme Court
noted:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissi-
ble to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege when he is under police custo-
dial interrogation. The prosecution may not, there-
fore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed
his privilege in the face of accusaiion. 34
SiThe trial court instructed the jury to disregard this
questioning but refused to declare a mistrial.
32498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
33384 U.S. 436 (1966).
34Id. at 468 n.37. Several circuits have held that
cross-examination of this type violates the defendant's fifth
amendment rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 475
F.2d 1066, 1068 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973), where comment on defendant's failure to tell his
story to the police was held to be a penalty levied on the
exercise of his constitutional right; United States v. Semen-
FIFTH AMENDMENT
In its case before the Supreme Court, the Govern-
ment argued that Hale's failure to offer some
explanation to the police reflected on the credibility
of his explanation at trial." The Government relied
on Raffel v. United States" to support its position
that it is permissible to impeach the defendant's
credibility by forcing an admission of previous silence
in the face of police questioning. Raffel, who had not
testified at his first trial, took the stand at the second
trial3" to refute testimony which was offered at both
trials. The Court in Raffel felt that the subsequent
testimony was inconsistent with refusal to testify at
the first trial, and therefore cross-examination on the
subject was proper for impeachment purposes.
Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the
Court in Hale, 18 discussed the evidentiary value of
silence in the circumstances of the case. He con-
cluded that silence did not have much value as
proof, but that the jury was likely to draw a strong
negative inference from the fact that Hale had not re-
sponded to police questions. 3" Since the potential
for prejudice was considerable, and the value of the
evidence for impeachment slight, permitting cross-
examination of the defendant concerning his silence
during police interrogation constituted prejudicial
error.
sohn, 421 F.2d 1206, 1209 (2d Cir. 1970), where question-
ing the defendant on his failure to give exculpatory
statements to the F.B.I. violated his fifth amendment right
to remain silent; United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057,
1060 (6th Cir. 1969), which said there was no duty to
disclose the defense to any law enforcement officer.
But in other cases defendant's failure to tell his story to
the police has been held to be conduct inconsistent with
subsequent testimony and therefore properly used for
impeachment. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burt v. New
Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938
(1973), where defendant's assertion at trial that a shooting
was an accident was found to be inconsistent with his failure
to check on or in some way aid the victim; United States v.
Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
869 (1971), which held that failure to tell the police of a
dangerous situation when he was apprehended was incon-
sistent with testimony that the defendant had been coerced
into selling heroin by strangers from Mexico.
1117 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 4037 (1975).
36271 U.S. 494 (1926).
3 A second trial was required when the first jury failed
to reach a verdict.
3 Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan,
Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Douglas and White filed opinions concurring in the
judgment. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.
39The Court in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S.
391 (1957) points out that thejury might make impermissi-
ble use of the testimony by implicitly equating the plea of
the fifth amendment with guilt. 353 U.S. at 424.
Justice Marshall distinguished Raffel, "where the
Court had assumed that the circumstances of the first
trial naturally called for a reply, from the situation of
an arrestee, who is under no duty to speak.4 1 He
reasoned that silence at the police station need not be
inconsistent with exculpatory testimony at trial.42
The circumstances of an arrest and interrogation
suggest possible interpretations other than guilt
when an accused does not offer explanations. He may
be intimidated by the hostile and unfamiliar sur-
roundings; he may be confused, frightened, or unwil-
"0Since the constitutional claim was not reached, the
Court did not decide whether Raffel has survived Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that the fifth
amendment was violated by prosecution comment on the
accused's failure to testify) and Johnson v. United States,
318 U.S. 189 (1943). In Johnson, Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority, condemned the court's procedure of
granting a claim of fifth amendment privilege but then
allowing it to be used against the accused to his prejudice:
The claim of privilege and its allowance is properly no
part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and no
inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn by them
from the legal assertion by the witness of his constitu-
tional right. The allowance of the privilege would be a
mockery of justice, if either party is to be affected
injuriously by it.
318 U.S. at 196-97 (dictum), quoting Phelin v. Kender-
dine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853).Justice Black, in a concurring
opinion in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391
(1957) (in which he was joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Douglas and Brennan) felt that Raffel, already
vitiated by Johnson, sho'uld be explicitly overruled:
It seems peculiarly incongruous and indefensible for
courts which exist and act only under the Constitution
to draw inferences of lack of honesty from invocation of
a privilege deemed worthy of enshrinement in the
Constitution.
353 U.S. at 425-26 (Black, J., concurring).
"1The careful wording of the opinion indeed obviates a
confrontation with Raffel. The basis of the Raffel decision
was that the defendant, by testifying, had totally waived his
immunity. Justice Stone rejected the idea of a qualified
waiver which would preclude comment on the claim of
privilege at the first trial, dismissing as insubstantial the
argument that a defendant would be burdened in the
exercise of his constitutional rights. He said that the
decision to testify is inescapably embarrassing in any event;
a rule of partial immunity would not make a significant
difference. 271 U.S. at 499.
2 In some situations, silence has been thought to imply
acquiescence:
Silence [in most circumstances ambiguous] gains more
probative weight where it persists in the face of
accusation, since it is assumed in such circumstances
that the accused would be more likely than not to
dispute an untrue accusation. Failure to contest an
assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquies-
cence only if it would have been natural under the
circumstances to object to the assertion in question.
422 U.S. at 176.
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ling to incriminate another. He may also be relying
on his right to remain silent. 43 Since there are
various possible inferences to be drawn from failure
to respond to police questioning, the Court concluded
that silence in this situation does not tend to have
significant probative value.
In arriving at its decision, the Court relied on the
analysis in Grunewald v. United States. 44 There the
defendant gave exculpatory testimony at trial, an-
swering questions which he had refused to answer as
a witness before the grand jury on the ground that
the answers might tend to incriminate him. The
prosecutor sought to impeach his credibility by cross-
examination about his previous reliance on the fifth
amendment right to remain silent. Grunewald held
that the defendant's prior silence was not so clearly
inconsistent with his later testimony as to justify its
adniission as a "prior inconsistent statement." Three
factors were identified as relevant to determining
consistency: (1) repeated assertions of innocence
before the grand jury; (2) the secretive nature of the
tribunal in which the initial questioning occurred;
and (3) the focus on petitioner as a potential
defendant at the time of the arrest, making it
"natural for him to fear that he was being asked
questions for the very purpose of providing evidence
against himself."
4"
Applying these factors to the present case, the
Court found that (1) Hale had repeatedly asserted his
innocence; (2) the police interrogation was secretive,
with fewer safeguards than grand jury proceedings;
and (3) Hale was clearly a potential defendant.at the
time of the questioning. The Court thus concluded
that his case was an even stronger one for exclusion
of the evidence than Grunewald.
In a brief concurring opinion, ChiefJustice Burger
agreed that the Court should not place the result on
constitutional grounds. He also added a few remarks
criticizing the generalization in Grunewald, which
was quoted by the majority as follows:
Innocent men are more likely to [remain silent] in
secret proceedings where they testify without advice
of counsel and without opportunity for cross-examina-
tion, than in open court proceedings where cross-ex-
amination and judicially supervised procedure pro-
vide safeguards for the establishing of the whole, as
against the possibility of merely partial truth. "
For example, he pointed out that this statement is
41 In the present case, Hale had been given the Miranda
warnings just before being questioned. See note 2 supra.
44353 U.S. 391 (1957).
4 Id. at 422-23.
4"422 U.S. at 178 n.6, quoting 353 U.S. at 422-23.
supported neither by empirical data nor by ordinary
human experience, since a timid person, innocent or
guilty, is apt to react quite differently from one who
is confident and assured.
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment, but
based his decision on the constitutional privilege: 47
I do not, like the Court, rest my conclusion on the
special circumstances of this case. I can think of no
special circumstances that would justify use of a con-
stitutional privilege to discredit or convict a person
who asserts it."'
He felt this case was controlled by Miranda, which
explicitly proscribes comment on a defendant's exer-
cise of his right to remain silent. 49 Justice Douglas
does not agree with the Court that evidence used to
impeach a defendant's credibility can be properly
distinguished from evidence tending to show guilt.
He would give full effect to Miranda in the impeach-
ment context.
Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion,
found that due process is violated if the prosecution is
permitted to draw an unfavorable inference from the
silence of a person who has just been informed that
he has a right to remain silent and that his words can
be used against him.
Surely Hale was not informed here that his silence, as
well as his words, could be used against him at trial.
Indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Mi-
randa warnings that this would not be the case. 5'
Although he states that he is still not "enthusiastic"
about Miranda, Justice White points out the basic
unfairness of telling an accused that he need not
explain his story and later discrediting him because
he did not. "'
From Hale and Grunewald we may conclude that
the prosecution will not be permitted to impeach a
defendant's credibility by comments and questions
about his failure to respond to pre-trial interroga-
tion, at least where the situation is consistent with
innocence. In making the determination of consist-
ency, three factors are common to both cases: (1)
repeated assertions of innocence, (2) the secretive
"Justice Douglas also agreed with Justice White that
comment on the privilege violates due process.
48422 U.S. at 182.
4"384 U.S. at 468 n.37. Justice Douglas also expressed
this view in Johnson and Grunewald. See note 40 supra.
50422 U.S. at 183.
"During oral argument, Justice Rehnquist commented
that the fact that an accused is told he may remain silent




nature of the tribunal, and (3) the person's status as a
potential defendant. As to the first factor, the Court
noted that there was nothing in the record of Hale's
testimony inconsistent with his claim of innocence.
The implication seems to be that if the witness makes
inconsistent or incriminating statements during his
testimony, cross-examination as to his pre-trial si-
lence might be permissible. The second factor in-
cludes grand jury investigations and police interro-
gations. The Court has recognized that there may
be acceptable reasons, consistent with innocence,
for remaining silent in the face of accusatory ques-
tioning. The dictum of the Grunewald opinion, 52 to
which Chief Justice Burger objected, is indeed
phrased as a general proposition for which there is
little actual support. But it is worth noting that ju-
dicial interpretations of silence often have been
based on just such intuitive concepts of normal be-
havior. " The exercise of interpreting silence as
consistent with innocence is not divorced from an
imaginative effort at character and motive analy-
sis. " The third factor in the Court's analysis of
consistent conditions is that the person be a "po-
tential defendant." 5 5 The grand jury witness in
Grunewald was acquainted with persons already
5 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
5 See Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 210 (1963) for a discussion of the assumption that
silence in the face of accusation implies consent. The author
notes a variety of maxims which have been quoted injudi-
cial decisions. These maxims variously imply that silence is
a sign of guilt, as in "it is the nature of innocence to be
impatient of a charge of guilt . . . and an innocent person
will usually spontaneously deny the accusation," or that it
is the better part of wisdom, as in "silence never shows itself
to so great an advantage as when it is made in reply to
calumny and defamation," and "wise men say nothing in
dangerous times." Id. at 210 n.3.
",The Court suggested some possible interpretations of a
suspect's silence:
In these often emotional and confusing circumstances,
a suspect may not have heard or fully understood the
question, or may have felt there was no need to
reply. . . Or the arrestee may simply react with
silence in response to the hostile and perhaps unfamil-
iar atmosphere surrounding his detention.
422 U.S. at 177.
"5The Court in Grunewald found it consistent with
innocence to claim the fifth amendment privilege in the face
of possible indictment:
For many innocent men who know that they are about
to be indicted will refuse to help create a case against
themselves under circumstances where lack of coun-
sel's assistance and lack of opportunity for cross-
examination will prevent them from bringing out the
exculpatory circumstances in the context of which
superficially incriminating acts occurred.
353 U.S. at 423.
known to be implicated in a tax fraud scheme and
therefore believed himself to be a potential defendant.
In this case, Hale had been arrested on suspicion and
had been the subject of eye-witness identification.
While the Court's three factors permitted a paral-
lel to be drawn between Hale's situation and that in
Grunewald, ih fact, they merely state that an
accused who declines to answer police questions and
subsequently offers exculpatory testimony has not
contradicted himself. But the Court in Hale rested its
decision on the "special circumstances" of the case.
The Government contended that an innocent suspect
would have offered an explanation of the incriminat-
ing circumstances because of the opportunity for
independent corroboration and the incentive of im-
mediate release. The Court disagreed in light of the
particular facts: the seemingly strong evidence
against Hale (such as the eye-witness identification,
his flight from the police and his possession of S158);
his prior contacts with the police; and his participa-
tion in a narcotics rehabilitation program. "In these
circumstances he could not have expected the police
to release him merely on the strength of his
explanation." '56 One must question how many such
facts are necessary in order for silence to be seen as
not inconsistent with innocence, that is, whether a
person who initially appears less culpable than Hale
would find that his silence in response to interroga-
tion could be used against him at trial.
Yet, one additional fact seems an essential as-
pect of the holding. That is the Miranda guarantee
of the constitutional privilege to remain silent.
Justice Marshall said of an arrestee that he is under
no duty to speak. He will ordinarily have been ad-
vised of his right to remain silent and that anything
he does say can and will be used against him in
court. The implication is that the arrestee can no
longer be considered to be in a situation which
"naturally calls for a reply," despite traditional
assumptions that those who are innocently accused
will protest. After suggesting possible reasons why
a suspect may remain mute, Justice Marshall points
out in a separate paragraph that one of the "special
circumstances" of this case was that Hale had just
been given the Miranda warnings, and then con-
cludes:
Under these circumstances, his failure to offer an
explanation during the custodial interrogation can as
easily be taken to indicate reliance on the right to
remain silent as to support an inference that the
explanatory testimony was a later fabrication.
57
56422 U.S. at 179-80.
51 d. at 177.
[Vol. 66
SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1975)
Surely this will be true of most suspects, no matter
what the particular circumstances of the case. Per-
haps the "circumstance" of having a constitutional
privilege, and being reminded of it when arrested,
will protect an accused from the hazards of being im-
peached by his own silence.
CONCLUSION
The focus in Hass and in Hale is on the value of
impeachment material as an aid in the "search for
truth" in a criminal case. In deciding these cases as it
has, the Court is modifying the concept of absolute
guarantees of an individual's rights in favor of a more
practical adjustment between constitutional safe-
guards and the tasks of investigation and prosecu-
tion. Inconsistent statements made by the defendant,
as in Hass, are helpful to the jury and need not be
barred as long as the statements were not coerced.
The Court thus gives more latitude to the investiga-
tive process than the Miranda rationale had per-
mitted. But when the accused has been silent, evi-
dence of his silence is usually not valuable to the
jury because it is too ambiguous. In Hale, the Court
does not base its determination on the accused's
right not to incriminate himself, but relies on evi-
dentiary grounds to bar impeachment by silence.
The Court is protecting the rights of the defendant
in a more traditional framework, leaving room for
balancing those rights with the claims of society.
